In the Kelly game (Kelly, 1956 ), a gambler is allowed to invest a part of the wealth in each turn. With a certain probability this investment is doubled, and otherwise it is lost. Motivated by the complexity of real investments, we propose several modifications of this game to investigate the influence of diversification and limited information on investment performance. Analytical and numerical results obtained from these toy games are well related to their real-life counterparts.
Introduction
Portfolio optimization is one of the key topics in finance. It can be characterized as a search for a satisfactory compromise between maximization of the investor's capital and minimization of the related risk. The outcome depends on properties of the investment opportunities and on the investor's attitude to risk but crucial is the choice of the optimization goals. In last decades, several approaches to portfolio optimization have been proposed-good recent overviews of the field can be found in [1, 2] .
In this paper we focus on the optimization strategy proposed by Kelly [3] where repeated investment for a long run is explored. As an optimization criterion, maximization of the average exponential growth rate of the investment is suggested. This approach has been investigated in detail in many subsequent works [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and it is optimal according to various criteria [9, 10] . Similar ideas lead to the universal portfolios described in [11] .
While the original concept focuses on a single investment in many successive time periods, we generalize it to a diversified investment. This extension is well suited for investigating the effects of diversification and limited information on investment performance. However, in complex models of real investments, important features can get unnoticed. Therefore we replace realistic assumptions about the available investment opportunities (e.g. log-normal distribution of returns) by simple risky games with binary outcomes. While elementary, this setting allows us to model and analytically treat many investment phenomena; all scenarios proposed and investigated here are meant as metaphors of real-life problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly overview the original Kelly problem and the main related results. In section 3 we allow investment in simultaneous risky games and investigate the resulting portfolio diversification. In section 4 it is shown that an investment profiting from additional information about one game (an insider approach) can be outperformed by a diversified investment (an outsider approach). Finally in section 5 we investigate the case where properties of a risky game are unknown and have to be inferred from its past outcomes. We show that in consequence, the Kelly strategy may be inapplicable.
Short summary of the Kelly game
In the original Kelly game, an investor (strictly speaking, a gambler) with the starting wealth W 0 is allowed to invest a part of the available wealth in a risky game. This investment is repeated. In each turn, the risky game has two possible outcomes: with the probability p the stake is doubled, with the complementary probability 1 − p the stake is lost. The winning probability p is constant and known to the investor. We introduce the game return R which is defined as (W r − W i )/W i where W i is the invested wealth and W r is the resulting wealth. For the risky game described above the possible returns per turn are +1 (win results in W r = 2W i ) and −1 (loss results in W r = 0).
Since properties of the risky game do not change in time, the investor bets the same fraction f of the actual wealth in each turn. The wealth then follows a multiplicative process, after N turns it is equal to
where R i is the game return in turn i. If we label the number of winning turns as w, it simplifies to the form
Since the successive returns R i are independent, from eq. (1) the average wealth after N turns can be written as (averages over realizations of the risky game we label as · )
Maximization of W N can be used to optimize the investment. Since for p < 1/2, W N is a decreasing function of f , the optimal strategy is to refrain from investing: f * = 0. By contrast, for p > 1/2 the quantity W N increases with f and thus the optimal strategy is to stake everything in each turn: f * = 1. Then, while W N is maximized, the probability of a bankrupt in first N turns is 1 − (1 − p) N . Thus in the limit N → ∞, the investor bankrupts inevitably. Thus, maximization of W N is not a good criterion for a long run investment.
In his seminal paper [3] , Kelly suggested maximization of the exponential growth rate of the investor's wealth
as a criterion for investment optimization; without affecting results, we use natural logarithm instead. Due to the multiplicative character of W N , G can be rearranged as
Notice that while we investigate investments within a long time horizon, the wealth W 1 after turn step plays a prominent role in the optimization. For the risky game introduced above is
When p < 1/2, f K < 0 (a short position) is suggested. In this paper we allow only nonnegative investment fractions and thus for p < 1/2 the optimal investment is f K = 0. For p ∈ [1/2; 1], the maximum of G achieved by f K can be rewritten as
where S(p) = − p ln p + (1 − p) ln(1 − p) is the entropy assigned to the risky game with the winning probability p.
There is a parallel way to f K . If we define the compounded return per turn R N by the formula W N = W 0 (1 + R N ) N and its limit value as R := lim N →∞ R N , it can be shown that R = exp[G] − 1. Thus maximization of R leads again to Eq. (6). Quoting Markowitz in [4], Kelly's approach can be summarized as "In the long-run, thus defined, a penny invested at 6.01% is better-eventually becomes and stays greater-than a million dollars invested at 6%." While G is usually easier to compute than R, in our discussions we often use R because it is more illustrative in the context of finance. Therefore the maximum of R can be of interest-using
The results obtained above we illustrate on a particular risky game with the winning probability p = 0.6. Since p > 0.5, it is a profitable game and a gambler investing all the available wealth has the expected return R = 2p − 1 = 20% in one turn. However, according to Eq. (6) in the long run the optimal investment fraction is f K = 0.2. Thus, the expected return in one turn is reduced to 0.2 × 20% = 4%. For repeated investment, the average compounded return R is a better quantity to measure the investment performance. From Eq. (8) it follows that in this case it is equal to 2.0%. We see that a wise investor gets in the long run much less than the illusive return 20% of the given game (and a naive investor gets even less). In the following section we investigate how diversification (if possible) can improve this performance.
Simultaneous independent risky games
Now we generalize the original Kelly game assuming that there are M independent risky games which can be played simultaneously in each time step (correlated games will be investigated in a separate work). In game i (i = 1, . . . , M ) the gambler invests the fraction f i of the actual wealth. Assuming fixed properties of the games, this investment fraction again does not change in time. For simplicity we assume that all games are identical, i.e. in each one with the probability p the invested wealth is doubled and with the probability 1 − p the investment is lost. Thus the return R i of game i is has two possible values, −1 and +1. Since the available games are identical, the optimal investment fractions are equal-we set f i = f . Thus, the investment optimization is simplified to a one-variable problem.
Notice that with the given set of risky games, there is the probability (1 − p) M that in one turn all M games are loosing. In consequence, for all p < 1 the optimal investment fraction f * is smaller than 1/M and thus M f * < 1 (otherwise the gambler risks getting bankrupted and the chance that this happens approaches one in the long run). Thus, there is no incentive for borrowing additional money for the investment.
If in one turn there are w winning and M − w loosing games, the investment return is (2w − M )f and the investor's wealth is multiplied by the factor 1 + (2w − M )f . Consequently, the exponential growth rate is
where
The optimal investment fraction is obtained by solving ∂G/∂f = 0. If we rewrite 2w
and use the normalization of P (w; M, p), we simplify this equation to
For M = 1 we obtain the well-known result f
. Formulae for M = 3, 4 are also available but too complicated to present here; for M > 4, Eq. (10) has no closed solution. Thus, for M ≥ 3 an approximate solution is necessary.
Approximate solution for an unsaturated portfolio
By an unsaturated portfolio we mean the case when a small part of the available wealth is invested, M f * ≪ 1. Then also |(2w − M )f * | ≪ 1 and this allows us to use the expansion 1/(1 + x) ≈ 1 − x + x 2 ± . . . (|x| ≪ 1) in Eq. (10). If we take only the first three terms into account, we obtain
After the summation, the approximate formula for the optimal investment fraction follows
When p − 1/2 ≪ 1/M , this result simplifies to f * = 2p − 1; this means that the gambler invests in each game as if other games were not present. Notice that for M = 1, 2, Eq. (11) is equal to the exact results obtained above.
Approximate solution for a saturated portfolio
By a saturated portfolio we mean the case when almost all available wealth is invested,
The extreme is achieved for p = 1 when the solution is f * = 1/M as all wealth is distributed evenly among the games. We introduce the new variable x := 1/M − f and rewrite Eq. (10) as
Since according to our assumptions 0 < x ≪ 1/M , to obtain a leading order approximation for f * we neglect x in the sum which is then equal to 1/w . The crude approximation 1/w ≈ 1/ w leads to the result
Notice that in the limit p → 1 we obtain f * = 1/M as expected. Approximations Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) can be continuously joined if for p ∈ [ 1 2 ; p c ] the first one and for p ∈ (p c ; 1] the second one is used. The boundary value p c is determined by the intersection of these two results. In Fig. 1 , a comparison of the approximations with numerical solutions of Eq. (10) is shown and a good agreement can be seen for most parameter values. As Fig. 1a shows, the largest deviations appear for a mediocre number of games (M ≃ 5) and a mediocre winning probability (p ≃ p c ).
Diverse games
Now we briefly investigate how the results obtained above change when available games are not identical. Let's label the winning probability of game i as p i (i = 1, . . . , M ); game returns are kept equal to ±1. Using the approximation from Sec. 3.1, one can show that in the case of an unsaturated portfolio the lowest approximation for the optimal investment fraction is
That is, the optimal investment for each of M games is the same as the optimal investment for this game alone. Notice that this result has a lower precision than Eq. (11) where one more expansion term was used. For a saturated portfolio we have no analytical treatment available-the approximation developed in Sec. 3.2 do not work well in this case. To obtain a better intuition about the system behavior we numerically investigated a simple case with M 1 games with the winning probability p 1 = 0.6 and one game with the winning probability p 2 ≤ p 1 . As can be seen in Fig. 2 , the optimal investment f * 2 differs from zero substantially only when p 2 is close to p 1 . We can conclude that when the optimal portfolio is saturated, it is mainly composed of the most profitable games. 
Diversification vs information
In real life, investors have only a limited information about the winning probabilities of the available risky games. These probabilities can be inferred using historical wins/losses data but these results are noisy and the analysis requires investor's time and attention (we investigate it in detail in Sec. 5). At the same time, insider information can improve the investment performance substantially. Notice that a similar insider-outsider approach can be seen in the classical paper on efficient markets [12] . We try to model the described situation by a competition of two investors who can invest in multiple risky games; each of these risky games has the winning probability alternating randomly between p + ∆ and p − ∆ (with even odds, p > 1/2, ∆ ≤ 1 − p). The insider focuses on one game in order to obtain better information about it-we assume that the exact winning probability is available to him. By contrast, the outsider knows only the time average p of the winning probability. The lack of information he tries to compensate by investing in multiple risky games. Both strategies have their advantages, below we investigate when the outsider performs better than the insider.
The insider knows the winning probability in each turn and thus the optimal investment fraction is given by Eq. (6). If p − ∆ > 1/2, the insider invests in each turn. If p − ∆ ≤ 1/2, the insider invests only in those turns when the winning probability is p + ∆ which means that the risky game is profitable. Combining the previous results, the exponential growth rate of the insider G I = ln W 1 can be simplified to
where S(p) is the entropy of the risky game with the winning probability p as in Eq. (7). About the outsider we assume that he invests in M identical and independent risky games. From his point of view, each risky game is described by the average winning probability p. Consequently, the exponential growth rate of his investment is given by Eq. (9) and for the optimal investment fraction results from the previous section apply. Now we can find the limiting values of the amplitude ∆ above which the insider performs better that an outsider investing in two or more games. That is, we want to solve the equation with respect to ∆. Although the outsider's optimal investment fraction is known analytically for M ≤ 4, due to the form of G I (p, ∆) it is impossible to find an analytical expression for ∆. An approximate solution can be obtained by expanding G I (p, ∆) in powers of ∆. First terms of this expansion has the form
By substituting this to Eq. (15) we obtain a quadratic (when p − ∆ ≤ 1/2) or biquadratic (when p − ∆ > 1/2) equation for ∆ which can be solved analytically. In this way we get ∆(p, M ); when ∆ is larger than ∆(p, M ), at given p and ∆ the insider performs better than an outsider diversifying into M games. When p − 1/2 ≪ 1, using expansions of G I (p, ∆) and
. To review the accuracy of our approximations, in Fig. 3 analytical results are shown for M = 2, 3, 4 together with numerical treatment of Eq. (15) . Notice that the proposed approximation works better for M = 2. This is because in this case p − ∆ > 1/2 and therefore the Taylor series for G I (p, ∆) can be used up to order ∆ 4 to obtain the approximate analytical solution. In Fig. 3 one can notice that the higher is the winning probability p, the harder it is for the insider to outperform the outsider.
Finite memory problem
As it has been already mentioned, in real life investors lack information on the exact value of the winning probability p-it has to be inferred from the available past data. In addition, since p can vary in time, it may be better to focus on a recent part of the data and obtain a fresh estimate. To model the described situation we assume that the investor uses only game outcomes from the last L turns for the inference and that the winning probability p is fixed during this period (a generalization to variable p will be also discussed). Notice that the impact of uncertainty on the Kelly portfolio was investigated from a different point of view in [13] .
Let's label the number of winning games in last L turns as w (w = 0, . . . , L) . The resulting information about p can be quantified using the Bayes theorem [14] as
Here π(p) is the prior probability distribution of p and P (w|L, p) is the probability distribution of w, given the values p and L. Due to mutual independence of consecutive outcomes, P (w|L, p) is a binomial distribution and P (w|L, p) = L w p w (1 − p) L−w . All information available to the investor is represented by the observation of w winning games in last L turns-there is no additional information entering the inference. Thus we assume the maximum prior ignorance and π(p) = 1 for p ∈ [0; 1] (a uniform prior). With the described forms of P (w|p, L) and π(p), Eq. (16) 
This represents the information about p after observing w wins in the last L turns. Now instead of one fixed value for the winning probability p, only the probability distribution ̺(p) is known. In such a case, maximization of G = ln W 1 results in f * = 2 p − 1. We prove this theorem for a special case of two possible winning probabilities p 1 and p 2 : P (p 1 ) = P 1 , P (p 2 ) = P 2 , P 1 + P 2 = 1 (extension to the general case is straightforward). The exponential growth rate can be now written as
This is maximized by f * = 2(P 1 p 1 + P 2 p 2 ) − 1. Since P 1 p 1 + P 2 p 2 = p , we have
From Eq. (17) follows p = (w + 1)/(L + 2) and consequently
for w ≥ L/2. Since we do not consider the possibility of short selling (f < 0) in this work, f * = 0 for 2w < L. Notice that even when w = L (all observed game are winning), f * < 1. This is a consequence of the noisy information about p.
It is instructive to compute the exponential growth rate G(p, L) of an investor with the memory length L. If p is fixed during the game, we have
Consequently, the compounded return is R(p, L) = exp[G(p, L)] − 1. This result can be compared with R K (p) of an investor with the perfect knowledge of p given by Eq. (8). In  Fig. 4a , the ratio ξ := R(p, L)/R K (p) is shown as a function of L for various p. Notice that when p is smaller than a certain threshold (which we numerically found to be approximately 0.63), R(p, L) < 0 for some L. As L increases, the investor's information about p improves and ξ → 1. When p is small, a very long memory is needed to make a profitable investment: e.g. for p = 0.51, L ≥ 1 761 and for p = 0.52, L ≥ 438 is needed. This is in agreement with the experience of finance practitioners, according to them the Kelly portfolio is sensitive to a wrong examination of the investment profitability (a scientific analysis of this problem can be found in [15] ). However, one should not forget about the a priori distribution π(p) which is an efficient tool to control the investment. For example, to avoid big losses in a weakly profitable game, π(p) constrained to the range [0; 3/4] can be used. In turn, if the game happens to be highly profitable and p > 3/4, such a choice of π(p) reduces the profit.
Due to its complicated form, G(p, L) given by Eq. (20) cannot be evaluated analytically. An approximate solution can be obtained by replacing summation by integration and noticing that for large values of L, P (w; p, L) is approaches the normal distribution g(w; µ, σ) with the mean µ = Lp and the variance σ 2 = Lp(1 − p). Then we have
. When σ is small compared to the length of the range where h(w) is positive, we can use the approximation
which is based on expanding h(w) in a Taylor series; a detailed discussion of this approximation can be found in [8] . It converges well when h(w) is positive (and thus bounded) on the range where g(w; µ, σ) differs from zero substantially. Using 3σ-range we obtain the condition L 9p(1 − p)/(p − 1/2) 2 ; when the equality holds, the final result obtained below has the relative error approximately 10%. Using h(w) written above, after neglecting terms of smaller order we obtain
In Fig. 4, the quantity 
When negative investment fractions are allowed, f * = (2w − L)/(L + 2) also for w < L/2. As shown in Appendix, one can then obtain the series expansion of G − (p, L) (the subscript denotes that f < 0 is allowed) in powers of 1/L
Notice that up to order 1/L it is identical with Eq. (22). When the terms shown above are used, Eq. (23) is highly accurate already for L = 20. Despite it is based on a different assumption, it can be also used to approximate G(p, L) discussed above; for small L it gives better results than the rough approximation Eq. (22).
Another interpretation of the finite memory problem
The optimal investment of a gambler with the memory length L can be inferred also by the direct maximization of the exponential growth rate. In addition to Eq. (20), from the investor's point of view G needs to be averaged over all possible values of p, leading to
This quantity can be maximized with respect to the investment fractions f (w, L) which is equivalent to the set of equations ∂G(L)/∂f (w, L) = 0 (w = 0, . . . , L). For π(p) = 1 in the range [0; 1] this set can be solved analytically and yields the same optimal investment fractions as given in Eq. (19).
The statistical models described above use π(p) as a model for the gambler's a priori knowledge of the winning probability p. This a priori knowledge can be caused by the lack of gambler's information but also it can stem from the fact that p changes in time. Then π(p) represents the probability that at a given moment, the winning probability is equal to p. Since such an evolution of game properties is likely to occur in real life, we investigate it in detail in the following paragraph. Notice that the possible changes of p in time are the key reason why a gambler should use only a limited recent history of the game.
As explained above, the evolution of p can be well incorporated to π(p). Consequently, if the changes of p are slow enough to assume that within time window of the length L the winning probability is approximately constant, all the analytical results above hold in the same form and thus the optimal investment is given by Eq. (19). To test this conclusion, we maximized G numerically with f (w, L) as variables (w = 0, . . . , L) for five separate realizations of the game, each with the length 1 000 000 turns and L = 10. In each realization, the winning probability changed regularly and followed the succession 0.5 → 1 → 0 → 0.5. As a maximization method we used simulated annealing [16, 17] . In Fig. 5 , the result is shown together with f * (w, L) given by Eq. (19) and a good agreement can be seen. Thus we can conclude that with a proper choice of π(p), the analyzed model describes also a risky game with a slowly changing winning probability. 
Conclusion
In this work we examined maximization of the exponential growth rate, originally proposed by Kelly, in various scenarios. Our main goal was to explore the effects of diversification and information on the investment performance. To ease the computation, instead of working with real assets we investigated simple risky games with binary outcomes: win or loss. This allowed us to obtain analytical results in various model situations.
First, in the case when multiple independent investment opportunities are simultaneously available we proposed two complementary approximations which yield analytical results for the optimal investment fractions. Based on these results, we proposed a simple framework to investigate the competition of the uninformed investor (the outsider) who diversifies his portfolio and the informed investor (the insider) who focuses on one investment opportunity. We found the conditions when gains from the diversification exceed gains from the additional information and thus the outsider outperforms the insider.
Finally we investigated the performance of the Kelly strategy when the return distribution (in our case the winning probability of a risky game) is not known a priori. When the past game outcomes represent the only source of information, we found a simple analytical formula for the optimal investment. We showed that for a weakly profitable game, a very long history is needed to allow a profitable investment. As game properties may change in time and thus the estimates obtained using long histories may be biased, this is an important limitation. With short period estimates suffering from uncertainty and long period estimates suffering from non-stationarity, the Kelly strategy may be unable to yield a profitable investment.
A Developing a series expansion for G − (p, L)
Since for the exponential growth rate G − (p, L) there is no closed analytical solution, we aim to obtain an approximate series expression. As in Sec. 
After exchanging the order of the summation and the integration in G − (p, L) it is now possible to sum over w, leading to G − (p, L) = ln 2/(L + 2) + R(p) + R(1 − p) where
The substitution τ := 1− ̺/L allows us to obtain series expansions of T (τ, p, L) and ln(− ln τ ) in powers of 1/L which after integration lead to Eq. (23).
